its tax base, and gains or losses are not reportable. 3 Recognizing that an item given away rather than sold affects the taxpayer's revenue, the law has always attempted to provide some incentive for donations to approved organizations by allowing the donation to be deducted in an amount equal to the foregone revenue. The law, however, has not always appeared to recognize, or at least to appreciate, the fact that the item is already deductible at cost by virtue of having been produced. Indeed, it is not until 1948 that one finds specific recognition of the fact that gifts affect costs as well as taxable revenues. Prior to 1948, presumably, the shrewd firm deducted the fair market value from computed net profits in the determination of taxable income and deducted total costs (not excluding the costs of the articles given away) from gross revenues in the determination of net profits. There was no ruling to prohibit the deduction of the gift twice: once as a contribution, once as an ordinary cost of production! There are two possible interpretations of this absence of law. Charitably, one might argue that perhaps no taxpayer had been bold enough to claim the double deduction, and therefore no ruling or case was neces-sary. Another construction is that, in the routine of auditing returns and verifying whether or not the gift was to a bona fide recipient, no notice was taken of the cost figures at all.
Our first task, then, will be to analyze, in Section ITI, rational behavior of the firm where a double deduction is allowed for product donations.
Two rules govern the current treatment of such donations. In Revenue Ruling 55-1385 one finds the following:
The fair market value of agricultural or manufactured products or property held for sale in the ordinary course of business which is contributed . . . is not includable in the gross income of the donor for Federal Income Tax purposes.... The fair market value which may be deducted from gross income . . . will be the replacement cost to the donor in his most favorable market. There must be an adjustment to inventory effecting the removal of the donated article and the costs pertaining thereto ... in order to avoid a double deduction.6
Here the fair market value is defined as "the replacement cost to the donor in his most favorable market." A more specific description of the treatment of deductions for gifts in kind is found in the Old Mission Valley Portland Cement Company case.7 In this case the taxpayer included the fair market value of the gift (which seems to have been its regular selling price) as a part of gross revenue, deducted it in the determination of taxable income, and included its costs of production in its ordinary expenses. The courts ruled that the taxpayer could also deduct the gross profit arising from inclusion of the gift in revenues, gross profits being the difference between actual cost and fair market value. the inclusion in revenues is canceled by the deduction from profits, thereby washing out, and the true deduction is cost plus gross profits, or selling price.
Our second task, in Section IV, will be an analysis of rational behavior when the firm Wre direct our attention first to the nonincorporated firm operating unrler pure competition and taxed under the individual income tax law. Let z be the total production of the frm, x be the quantity of product that the firm sells on the open market, and y be the quantity of product donated to some qualified charitable organization (that is, = x + y). Suppose the firm sells its product for a price p and produces at a short-run total cost given by the function C(S), where the latter is convex from below beyond some level of production. Let the tax function faced by the firm be i[0], where 0 is the firm's taxable income; that is, gross income minus all deductio-ns and exemptions. Under the provisions of the tax law, if K is the total dollar amount of all the firm's exemptions and deductions that are constant (independent of production and donations), and if the donation, y, is deductible at both its cost and its market value, then 6=px-C(z) -py-K =pz-C(z) -2py-K.
In equation (1) px is the firm's gross receipts, while px -C(z) is the firm's "profit (or loss) from business" as it is termed on Form 1040 of the Individual Income Tax Return. The latter sum would also be "adjusted gross income" if the proprietor earned no wages or income from other sources such as dividends and interest. The quantity Py would be the firm's deductions because of donations in the form of product. Note in equation (1) that, for every unit given away rather than sold, taxable income decreases by 2p dollars.
In line with the postulates of pure competition, it will be assumed that the quantity y which is given away has no effect on the market price of the product or on the amount the firm can sell at that price. Profits, net of income taxes, can therefore be written as 
the usual conditions for an optimum; and, second, adjust the quantity of output given away to a level y= y, such that
The latter condition asserts that, given zo as determined from (3), units are given away until the marginal tax rate falls to 2, or until the firm is operating in the 50 per cent income-tax bracket. This condition may be derived verbally as follows: For each unit that is given away rather than sold, the loss due to failure to sell is -p. On the other hand, the gain is given by the marginal tax rate multiplied by the amount by which taxable income declines. But taxable income declines p due to the loss in sales and another p because the value of the unit is deductible when donated. Hence the total gain from donating a unit rather than selling it is -p + T' {2p}, and units will be given away until this marginal gain is zero; that is, -p + T' {2p} = 0 or
There are two boundary conditions on the solution in addition to these marginal conditions. The first stems from the fact that, if the firm is operating in an incometax bracket less than or equal to 50 per cent, the firm cannot improve its position by giving away part of its output. The second boundary condition grows out of a further provision of the income-tax law, namely, that, "in general, the deduction for contributions may not exceed 20 percent of From this analysis we can conclude that, under the double-deductibility interpretation of the income-tax law, if a firm produced a form of property which it was feasible to donate to charitable institutions, then profit maximization required the proprietor of that firm to adjust sales to a level that would just place him in the 50 per cent income-tax bracket. The one exception to this would arise where the firm's donations in the form of product were as much as 30 per cent of "adjusted gross income."
5) THE CASE OF INDEPEN.DENCE BETWEEN SALES AND DONATIONS
Dynamic considerations, uncertainty, ignorance of the complete cost function, or the failure to use marginal principles in priceoutput determination may render the preceding approach impractical for decisionmaking. For example, the firm may have a fixed-price policy because of fear of retaliation, "spoiling the market," or other considerations and may proceed to sell all that the market will absorb at that price. Under these conditions, can the firm improve its position by producing output purely for donation purposes and deducting the value of such donations from its taxable income? The answer is "Yes."
To simplify the analysis, we shall assume that the donation is to a non-competing market such as a charity which is not itself a customer of the firm in question or one that will distribute the donation exclusively to markets in which the firm cannot compete. An example of this latter case would arise if a shoe manufacturer who could not seriously consider selling shoes in Belgium gave shoes to CARE; this organization could give away an almost indefinite number of shoes to the Belgians.9
Suppose our firm finds that it can sell x units at the established price p. Using the same notation as before, the problem is to and, in equilibrium, the marginal tax rate is less than 2. Consequently, a firm whose price was greater than its marginal cost could benefit from donations even if it fell in an incomne-tax bracket of less than 2-I One of the advantages offered by CARE as a dumping market is the fact that this organization allows the donor to specify the country to which the gift is to be sent. 
If the firm's best estimate of total cost is
Pl?0.03-f3.
IV. OPTIMAL PRODUCT DONATIONTS BY FIRMS UNDER DEDUCTIBILITY AT MARIKT VALUE ONLY
Since the 1955 ruling, in which the Bureau of Internal Revenue clearly recognized that the tax law did not prohibit double deduction of donations in kind, the application of the law has allowed the firm to deduct such donations at market value only. XWhat has not been recognized is that, under this interpretation, both the corporate and the non-corporate enterprise, under conditions likely to prevail in practice, can still increase profits after taxes by making product donations. The new ruling reduces the magnitude of the profits to be so gained but still does not place product donations on a par with cash donations, which clearly do not yield the donor a net gain. The reason for this is simply that, under the present law, a separate give-away market is created for firms with excess capacity, and, under conditions which are still fairly weak, it pays to produce for "sale" in this market.
a) THE THEORY OF THE FIRM UNDER THE 1955 RULING
The first important area in which the new ruling delimits the range of application of the law is for the firm in pure competition. Under pure competition no gains can accrue to the firm, regardless of its income-tax bracket, from product donations deductible at market price, since, by hypothesis, the firm can sell unlimited quantities at the going market price.
This can be seen mathematically by observing that equation (1) Clearly, allowing deductions for cash gifts made to acceptable organizations is a direct inducement extended to taxpayers to encourage such gifts. In effect, the government pays a portion of the cost of such gifts, a percentage equal to the tax rate; one would suspect that the intention in extending such inducements to donations other than cash is to subsidize them to the same extent. There seems to be little reason why Congress would view product donations as either more or less socially desirable than cash gifts. This raises the question: Just how should the tax law be stated if product donations are to be put on a par with cash gifts?
As it turns out, under both the individual and the corporate income tax, there is a simple general ruling that will make all firms indifferent between product donations and cash donations. Such a ruling is simply to allow the firm to compute taxable income by deducting from gross receipts the total cost of producing both the units sold and any units that are donated. Under such a ruling, profit would be given by
